Abstract-Recently, an opinion dynamics model has been proposed to describe a network of individuals discussing a set of logically interdependent topics. For each individual, the set of topics and the logical interdependencies between the topics (captured by a logic matrix) form a belief system. We investigate the role the logic matrix and its structure plays in determining the final opinions, including existence of the limiting opinions, of a strongly connected network of individuals. We provide a set of results that, given a set of individuals' belief systems, allow a systematic determination of which topics will reach a consensus, and which topics will disagreement in arise. For irreducible logic matrices, each topic reaches a consensus. For reducible logic matrices, which indicates a cascade interdependence relationship, conditions are given on whether a topic will reach a consensus or not. It turns out that heterogeneity among the individuals' logic matrices, including especially differences in the signs of the off-diagonal entries, can be a key determining factor. This paper thus attributes, for the first time, a strong diversity of limiting opinions to heterogeneity of belief systems in influence networks, in addition to the more typical explanation that strong diversity arises from individual stubbornness.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE has been great interest over the past few years in agent-based network models of opinion dynamics that describe how individuals' opinions on a topic evolve over time as they interact [1] , [2] . The seminal discrete-time French-Harary-DeGroot model [3] - [5] (or DeGroot model for short) assumes that each individual's opinion at the next time step is a convex combination of his/her current opinion and the current opinions of his/her neighbours. This weighted averaging aims to capture social influence, where individuals exert a conforming influence on each other so that over time, opinions become more similar (and thus giving rise to the term "influence network"). For networks satisfying mild connectivity conditions, the opinions reach a consensus, i.e. the opinion values are equal for all individuals.
Since then, and to reflect real-world networks, much focus has been placed on developing models of increasing sophistication to capture different socio-psychological features that may be involved when individuals interact. The HegselmannKrause model [6] - [9] introduced the concept of bounded confidence, which is used to capture homophily, i.e. the phenomenon whereby individuals only interact with those other individuals whose opinion values are similar to their own. The Altafini model [10] - [13] introduced negative edge weights to model antagonistic or competitive interactions between individuals (perhaps arising from mistrust). An individual's propensity to assimilate information in a biased manner, by more heavily weighting opinions close to his or her own, is studied in [14] . The Friedkin-Johnsen model generalised the DeGroot model by introducing the idea of "stubbornness", where an individual remains (at least partially) attached to his or her initial opinion [15] , [16] . Of particular note is that the DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen models have been empirically examined [16] - [18] . For more detailed discussions on opinion dynamics modelling, we refer the reader to [1] , [2] , [19] .
Recently in [20] , a multi-dimensional extension to the Friedkin-Johnsen was proposed to describe a network of individuals who simultaneously discuss a set of logically interdependent topics. That is, an individual's position on Topic A may influence his/her position on Topic B due to his/her view of constraints or relations between the two topics. Such interdependencies are captured in the model by a "logic matrix". This interdependence can greatly shift the final opinion values on the set of topics since now the interdependencies and the social influence from other individuals both affect opinion values. The model is used in [21] to explain that the shift in the US public's opinions on the topic of whether the 2003 Invasion of Iraq was justified was due to shifting opinions on the logically interdependent topic of whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The set of topics, the interdependent functionalities between the topics, and the mechanism by which an individual processes such interdependencies forms a "belief system" as termed by Converse in his now classical paper [22] . For networks where all individuals have the same logic matrix, a complete stability result is given using algebraic conditions in [20] and using graph-theoretic conditions in [23] . Of course, the assumption that all individuals have the same logic matrix is restrictive. Heterogeneous logic matrices were considered in [21] , but at least one individual is required to exhibit stubbornness in order to obtain a stability result. This paper will also consider a generalisation of the multidimensional model proposed in [20] for the evolution of opinions in belief systems, going beyond [20] , [21] by analysing the effects of the logic matrix, including especially heterogeneity of the logic matrices among the individuals, on the limiting opinion distribution. We first establish a general convergence result for the model with heterogeneous logic matrices on strongly connected networks. Then, we provide a set of results which enables the systematic determination of whether for a given topic, the opinions of the individuals will reach a consensus, or will reach a state of persistent disagreement.
We find that the nature of the heterogeneity of the logic structure among the individuals, viz. the logical interdependencies between topics, and the structure itself, plays a major role in determining whether opinions on a given topic reach a consensus or fail to do so. If the logical interdependencies do not have a cascade structure, then consensus is always secured. When the logical interdependencies have a cascade structure, and by considering topics at the top of a cascade structure to be axiom(s) that an individual's belief system is built upon, we establish that discussion of the axiomatic topics will lead to a consensus. In contrast, we discover that persistent disagreement can arise in the topics at the bottom of the cascade when certain types of heterogeneity exist in the logic matrices. A preliminary work [24] considers the special case of lower triangular logic matrices, but we go well beyond that in this paper by considering general logic matrix structures and providing a comprehensive account of the results.
We discover that if there is a failure to reach a consensus, then it is typically not minor; in general a strong diversity of opinions will eventually emerge. In more detail, a network is said to exhibit weak diversity [25] if opinions eventually converge into clusters where there is no difference between opinions in the same cluster (consensus is the special case of one single cluster). Strong diversity occurs when the opinions converge to a configuration of persistent disagreement, with a diverse range of values (there may be clusters of opinions with similar, but not equal, values within a cluster). Weak diversity is a common outcome in the HegselmannKrause model, with the network becoming disconnected into subgroups associated with the clusters. In strongly connected networks, weak diversity also emerges in the Altafini model (specifically polarisation of two opinion clusters) when the network is "structurally balanced". However, sign reversal of some selected edges may destroy the structural balance of the network, causing the opinions to converge to a consensus at an opinion value of zero, indicating that the polarisation phenomenon is not robust to changes in the network structure.
There has been a growing interest to study models which are able to capture the more realistic outcome of strong diversity in networks which remain connected [25] , [26] . The DeGroot model shows that social influence in a connected network acts to bring opinions closer together until a consensus is achieved, meaning some other socio-psychological process must be at work to generate strong diversity. The FriedkinJohnsen model attributes strong diversity to an individual's stubborn attachment to his/her initial opinion [15] . In contrast, [27] considers a model where an individual's susceptibility to interpersonal influence is dependent on the individual's current opinion; strong diversity is verified as a special case. The papers [25] , [26] consider two features that might give rise to strong diversity, the first being "social distancing", and the second being an individual's "desire to be unique". Experimental studies are inconclusive with regards to the existence of ubiquitous and persistent antagonistic interpersonal interactions (there might be limited occurrences in the network over short time spans) [20] , while it is unlikely that an individual has the same level of stubborn attachment to his or her initial opinion value for months or years.
In contrast to these works, we identify for the first time in the literature that strong diversity can arise because of the structure of individuals' belief systems, and show that heterogeneity among belief systems plays a crucial role. In the model, each individual is concurrently undergoing two driver processes; individual-level belief system dynamics to secure logical consistency of opinions across a set of topics, and interpersonal influence to reach a consensus. Our findings explain that when the two drivers do not interfere with each other, a consensus is reached, whereas conflict between the two drivers leads to persistent disagreement even though all individuals are trying to reach a consensus. This gives a new and illuminating perspective as to why strong diversity can last for extended periods of time in connected networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we provide notations, an introduction to graph theory and the opinion dynamics model. At the same time, a formal problem statement is given. The main results are presented in Section III, with simulations given in Section IV for illustration, and conclusions in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMAL PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin by introducing some mathematical notations used in the paper. The (i, j) th entry of a matrix M is denoted m ij . A matrix A is said to be nonnegative (respectively positive) if all a ij are nonnegative (respectively positive). We denote A as being nonnegative and positive by A ≥ 0 and A > 0, respectively. A matrix A ≥ 0 is said to be row-stochastic (respectively, row-substochastic) if there holds n j=1 a ij = 1, ∀i (respectively, if there holds n j=1 a ij ≤ 1, ∀i and ∃k : n j=1 a kj < 1). The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by M . Let 1 n and 0 n denote, respectively, the n × 1 column vectors of all ones and all zeros. The n × n identity matrix is given by I n . Two matrices A ∈ R n×m and B ∈ R n×m are said to be of the same type, denoted by A ∼ B, if and only if a ij = 0 ⇔ b ij = 0. The Kronecker product is denoted by ⊗. The infinity norm and spectral radius of a square matrix A is A ∞ and ρ(A), respectively. A square matrix A ≥ 0 is primitive if ∃k ∈ N : A k > 0 [28, Definition 1.12].
A. Graph Theory
The interaction between n individuals in a social network, and the logical interdependence between topics can modelled using a weighted directed graph. To that end, we introduce some notations and concepts for graphs. A directed graph
is a triple where node v i is in the finite, nonempty set of nodes V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. The set of ordered edges is E ⊆ V × V. We denote an ordered edge as e ij = (v i , v j ) ∈ E, and because the graph is directed, in general the existence of e ij does not imply existence of e ji . An edge e ij is said to be outgoing with respect to v i and incoming with respect to v j . Self-loops are allowed, i.e. e ii may be in E. The matrix A ∈ R n×n associated with G[A] captures the edge weights. More specifically, a ij = 0 if and only if e ji ∈ E. If A is nonnegative, then all edges e ij have positive weights, while a generic A may be associated with a signed graph G[A], having signed edge weights.
A directed path is a sequence of edges of the form (v p1 , v p2 ), (v p2 , v p3 ), . . . where v pi ∈ V are unique, and e pipi+1 ∈ E. Node i is reachable from node j if there exists a directed path from v j to v i . A graph is said to be strongly connected if every node is reachable from every other node. A square matrix A is irreducible if and only if the associated graph G[A] is strongly connected. A directed cycle is a directed path that starts and ends at the same vertex, and contains no repeated vertex except the initial (which is also the final) vertex. The length of a directed cycle is the number of edges in the directed cyclic path. A directed graph is aperiodic if there exists no integer k > 1 that divides the length of every directed cycle of the graph [28] . Note that any graph with a self-loop is aperiodic.
A signed graph G is said to be structurally balanced (respectively structurally unbalanced) if the nodes V = {v 1 , . . . v n } can be partitioned (respectively cannot be partitioned) into two disjoint sets such that each edge between two nodes in the same set has a positive weight, and each edge between nodes in different sets has a negative weight [29] .
The following is a useful result employed in the paper. Note that the irreducibility of A (implied by the strong connectivity property of G[A]) implies that if a k exists such that A k > 0, then A j > 0 for all j > k.
B. The Multi-Dimensional DeGroot Model
In this paper, we investigate a recently proposed multidimensional extension to the DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen models [20] , [21] , which considers the simultaneous discussion of logically interdependent topics.
Formally, consider a population of n individuals discussing simultaneously their opinions on m topics, with individual and topic index set I = {1, . . . , n} and J = {1, . . . , m}, respectively. Individual i's opinions on the m topics at time t = 0, 1, . . ., are denoted by
In this paper, we adopt a standard definition of an opinion [21] . In particular, x In the multi-dimensional DeGroot model, x i (t) evolves according to
where the nonnegative scalar w ij represents the influence weight individual i accords to the vector of opinions of individual j. Thus, the influence matrix W , with (i, j) th entry w ij , can be used to define the graph G[W ] that describes the interpersonal influences of the n individuals. We assume that w ii > 0 for all i ∈ I and n j=1 w ij = 1 for all i ∈ I, which implies that W is row-stochastic. The matrix C i , with (p, q) th entry c pq,i , is termed the logic matrix. In [20] , [21] , the authors elucidate that C i represents the logical interdependence between the m topics as seen by individual i. We note that the C i are assumed to be heterogeneous (i.e. ∃i, j : C i = C j ). Indeed, a critical aspect of this paper is to study how the structure of the C i s, especially heterogeneity, can determine whether certain topics have opinions that reach a consensus or a persistent disagreement.
We now illustrate with a simple example how C i is used by individual i to obtain a set of opinions consistent with any logical interdependencies between each topic, and in doing so, motivate that certain constraints must be imposed on C i due to the problem context (these constraints are implicitly imposed in [20] , [21] , but without motivation).
Suppose that there are two topics. Topic 1: The exploration of Space is important to mankind's future. Topic 2: The exploration of Space should be privatised. Using Topic 1 as an example, and according to the definition of an opinion given above Eq. (1), x 1 i = 1 represents individual i's maximal support of the importance of Space exploration, while x 1 i = −1 represents maximal rejection that Space exploration is important. Now, suppose that individual i has x i (0) = [1, −0.2] , i.e. individual i initially believes with maximal conviction that Space exploration is important and initially believes with some (but not absolute) conviction that Space exploration should not be privatised 1 . Let
This tells us that individual i's opinion on the importance of Space exploration is unaffected by his or her own opinion on whether Space exploration should be privatised. On the other hand, individual i's opinion on Topic 2 depends positively on his or her own opinion on Topic 1, perhaps because individual i believes privatised companies are more effective. In the absence of opinions from other individuals, individual i's opinions evolves as
which yields lim t→∞ x i (t) = [1, 1] , i.e. individual i eventually believes that Space exploration should be privatised. Thus, In general, one might expect, as do we in this paper, that an individual's belief system without interpersonal influence from neighbours will eventually become consistent. For a topic p which is independent of all other topics, one also expects that x p i (t + 1) = x p i (t) for all t. To ensure the belief system is consistent, we impose the following assumption. Assumption 1. The matrix C i , for all i ∈ I, is such that each eigenvalue of C i is either 1 or has modulus less than 1. If an eigenvalue of C i is 1, then it is semi-simple 2 . For all i ∈ I and p ∈ J , there holds m q=1 |c pq,i | = 1, and the diagonal entries satisfy c pp,i > 0.
The assumptions on the eigenvalues of C i ensure that Eq. (3) converges to a limit, and are necessary and sufficient for individual i's belief system to eventually become consistent. The other assumptions lead to desirable properties for the system Eq. (1). Specifically, the reasonable assumption that c pp,i > 0 means topic p is positively correlated with itself. The constraint m q=1 |c pq,i | = 1 for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J ensures that x [20] ), and also implies that if topic p is independent of all other topics, i.e. c pq,i = 0 for all q = p, then c pp,i = 1. The well-studied special case where topics are totally independent is C i = I m . We are now in a position to formally define this paper's objective.
C. Objective Statement
This paper is focused on establishing the effects of the set of logic matrices C i , i ∈ I on the evolution of opinions, and in particular the limiting opinion configuration. First, we record two assumptions on the logic matrix and the network topology, which will hold throughout this paper. Assumption 2. For every i, j ∈ I, there holds C i ∼ C j . Assumption 3. The influence network G[W ] is strongly connected, W is row-stochastic, and w ii > 0, ∀i ∈ I. Assumption 2 implies that, for every i, j ∈ I, the graphs G[C i ] and G[C j ] have the same structure (but possible with different edge weights, including weights of opposing signs). This means that all individuals have the same view on which topics have dependent relationships with which other topics, but the assigned weights c ij (and signs) may be different. This assumption ensures that the scope of this paper is reasonable, because otherwise the assumption that C i ∼ C j does not hold would introduce too many different scenarios to analyse. nm , this paper will investigate a method to systematically determine when there exists, and when there does not exist, an
We will show that C i of a certain structure always guarantees consensus, and conversely, that C i of a certain other structure will lead to disagreement in certain identifiable topics.
Next, we provide further discussion to motivate Objective 1, including our interest in heterogeneous C i . The dynamics of the form Eq. (1) is a variation on the model studied in [20] , [21] , and we explain our interest in this particular variation by explaining in detail the differences between Eq. (1) and work in [20] , [21] .
For convenience, denote the vector of opinions for the entire influence network as x = [x 1 (t) , . . . , x n (t) ] ∈ R nm . Supposing that the logic matrices were indeed homogeneous, i.e. C i = C j = C for all i, j ∈ I, we can verify that much of the analysis becomes rather easy. For then one could write the influence network dynamics as
and limiting behaviour is characterised by the following result. 
For completeness and to aid discussion, we also record the Friedkin-Johnsen variant to Eq. (1), which is given as
Here, the parameter λ i ∈ [0, 1] represents individual i's susceptibility to interpersonal influence, while 1−λ i represents the level of stubborn attachment by individual i to his/her initial opinion x i (0). This paper studies the special case where there are no stubborn individuals, i.e. λ i = 1 for all i ∈ I, and thus Eq. (6) is equivalent to Eq. (1). The paper [20] mainly focuses on the considerable challenge of obtaining complete convergence results for the model in Eq. (6) but with a homogeneous C, and aside from some short remarks, does not investigate the effect of C on the final opinion distribution (assuming the opinions do in fact converge to a steady state). The paper [21] secures a convergence result for heterogeneous C i but makes an assumption that there is at least one somewhat stubborn individual. Unlike [20] and [21] , the key focus of this paper is to investigate the effect of the structure of C i , including heterogeneity, on the final opinion distribution.
We explain this further. If λ i < 1 and C i = I m for all i ∈ I, then existing results establish that under Assumption 3, a strong diversity of opinions emerges [20] , with obviously no effects arising from the C i matrix. On the other hand, consider the case of homogeneous logic matrices and no stubbornness. For any W satisfying Assumption 3, it is known that lim k→∞ W k = 1 n γ where γ is a left eigenvector of W associated with the simple eigenvalue at 1, having entries γ j > 0, and normalised to satisfy γ 1 n = 1 [28] . Combining with Theorem 1, we can conclude that under Assumption 3 and if C i = C j = C and λ i = 1 for all i, j ∈ I, the opinions of all individuals on any given topic reach a consensus. That is, for all i ∈ I, there holds lim t→∞ x i (t) = n j=1 γ j C t x j (0). In contrast, this paper assumes heterogeneous C i and no stubbornness among individuals. If we can show that opinions on a given topic fail to reach a consensus in the general case of C i = I m , and instead strong diversity emerges, then this failure must be attributed to the structure, and the heterogeneity, of the C i among individuals. This would constitute a novel insight into the emergence of strong diversity in strongly connected networks, linking it for the first time to differences in individuals' belief systems as opposed to stubbornness [15] , a desire to be unique [25] , [26] , or social distancing [25] .
To conclude this subsection, we now provide the definition of "competing logical interdependencies" which will be important in some scenarios for characterising the final opinions.
Definition 1 (Competing Logical Interdependence
). An influence network is said to contain individuals with competing logical interdependencies on topic p ∈ J if there exist individuals i, j such that for some q ∈ J \ {p}, C i and C j have nonzero entries c pq,i and c pq,j that are of opposite signs.
In other words, individuals with competing logical interdependencies are those who, when having the same opinion on topic q, move in opposite directions on the opinion spectrum for topic p. Such occurrences can be prevalent in society. Using the example in Section II-B, one might have an individual j with
because j considers that private companies are profit-driven, and therefore cannot be ethically trusted with the exploration of Space. Then, from Eq. (3), one has that x j (∞) = [1, −1] , i.e. individual j eventually firmly believes Space exploration should not be privatised. In particular,
. In light of Assumption 2, if two individuals have competing interdependencies on topic p, then for every individual i ∈ I, there is necessarily some individual k ∈ I \ {i} with whom individual i has competing logical interdependence on topic p: the nonzero entries c pq,i and c pq,k are of opposite signs for some q ∈ J .
Remark 1.
Recall that C i is individual i's set of constraints/functional dependencies between topics in i's belief system. Thus, heterogeneity of C i may arise for many different reasons, such as education, background, or expertise in the topic. For example, if the set of topics is related to sports, a professional athlete may have very different weights in C i compared to someone that does not pursue an active lifestyle. Competing interdependencies may also arise for contentious issues, such as gun control discussions in the USA. Interestingly, [30] showed that when presented with the same published statement on an issue, different people could take opposite positions on the issue.
In the next section, we provide the set of main theoretical results of this paper to address Objective 1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results are presented in two parts. First, we establish a general convergence result for the networked system. Then, we analyse the limiting opinion distribution and the role of the set of logic matrices in determining whether opinions for a given topic reach consensus or fail to do so. In order to place the focus on the theoretical results and interpretations as social phenomena, all proofs are presented to the Appendix.
A. Convergence
The network dynamics of Eq. (1) are given by
and we define the system matrix above as B. To begin, we rewrite the network dynamics Eq. (8) into a different form to aid analysis by introducing a coordinate transform (actually a reordering). In particular, define
, for k ∈ J as the vector of all n individuals' opinions on the k th topic. Then, y(t) = [y 1 (t) , . . . , y m (t) ] captures all of the n individuals' opinions on the m topics. One obtains that
where diag(c kj ) ∈ R n is a diagonal matrix with the i th diagonal element of diag(c kj ) being c kj,i , the (k, j) th entry of C i . It follows that
We denote the matrix in Eq. (10) as A, with block matrix elements A pq = diag(c pq )W . We now show how the system Eq. (10) can be considered as a consensus process on a multiplex (or multi-layered) signed graph. Consider the matrix A in Eq. 
, with node set V[B] = {v 1 , . . . , v nm }, one can consider the node subsetṼ q = {v (q−1)m+1 , . . . , v qm }, q ∈ I as a layer of a multi-layer graph with vertices associated with the opinions of individual q on topics 1, . . . , m. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where each layer is identified by a dotted green ellipse border. A key motivation to study G[A] and the dynamical system Eq. (10) is that all the block diagonal entries A ii of A are nonnegative and irreducible because Assumption 1 indicates that diag(c pp ) has positive diagonal entries. This means that the edges between nodes in the subset
. . , v pn }, p ∈ J have positive weights, and this property greatly aids in the checking of the structural balance or unbalance of the network
Verify from the row-stochastic property of W and the rowsum property of C i in Assumption 1 that the entries of A satisfy nm q=1 |a pq | = 1 for all p = 1, . . . , nm. We therefore conclude that Eq. (10) has the same dynamics as the discretetime Altafini model (see e.g. [10] , [11] ). Remark 2. Although Eq. (10) has the same dynamics as the discrete-time Altafini model, a number of important differences exist. First, the context of negative edge weights is entirely different: in the Altafini model, w ij < 0 implies individual i mistrusts individual j [10] . In contrast, Eq. (10) assumes nonnegative influence w ij ≥ 0, and the negative edge weights arise from negative logical interdependencies in C i . Moreover the network structure of G[A] is affected by both the influence network G[W ] and the logic matrix graphs
The main convergence result is given as follows. Having established that the opinion dynamical system always converges, we now address Objective 1 by studying the influence of C i in determining the limiting opinion vector y * .
B. Consensus and Disagreement of Each Topic
We now explain how to use the logic matrices C i to systematically determine whether opinions on a given topic p ∈ J will reach a consensus or not. We defer discussion of the social interpretation of the theoretical results until Section III-C, and illustrate some of the conclusions drawn in this section with selected simulations in Section IV.
Consider the graph G[C i ] associated with C i for some i ∈ I, which is a signed graph if there are negative offdiagonal entries in C i . It turns out (see Theorem 3 immediately below) that if C i for all i ∈ I are irreducible, then all topics will reach a consensus (although the consensus value for two different topics p and q may be different). We remark that irreducible logic matrices correspond to G[C i ] which are strongly connected, and thus for any two topics p, q ∈ J , there is a (possibly signed) directed path from p to q. In other words, all topics are directly or indirectly dependent on all other topics. Further to the conclusions of Theorem 3, one can obtain the following result for the case where consensus to a nonzero opinion value is achieved. 
Consider now the more general case where C i for all i ∈ I are reducible. Thus, G[C i ] is no longer strongly connected.
The logic matrices of all individuals can be expressed in a lower block triangular form through an inessential reordering of the topic set. From Assumption 2, we further conclude that there exists a common permutation matrix P such that, for all i ∈ I, P T C i P is lower block triangular. Without loss of generality, we therefore assume that the topics p ∈ J are ordered such that, for each i ∈ I,
where C jj,i ∈ R sj ×sj is irreducible for any j ∈ S {1, 2, · · (12) with s 0 = 0. Though reducible C i may seem to be restrictive, they are in fact common given the problem context since they imply a cascade logical interdependence structure among the topics. This may be representative of an individual i who obtains C i by sequentially building upon an axiom or axioms (the first C jj,i block matrices). The two topics of the Space exploration example given in Eq. (2) constitute one such example of a belief system driven by an axiom (Topic 1).
From the perspective of the graph G[C i ], the expression in Eq. (11) enables G[C i ] to be divided into strongly connected components which are "closed" or "open". (This is related to a concept called the condensation of a graph, see [28] ). Formally, we say that a subgraphḠ is a strongly connected component of G ifḠ is strongly connected and any other subgraph of G strictly containingḠ is not strongly connected. A strongly connected componentḠ of a graph G is said to be closed if there are no incoming edges toḠ from a node outside ofḠ, and is said to be open otherwise. The simplest possible strongly connected component is a single node, and it would be closed if there were no incoming edges to it. Figure 2 shows an example of a graph G[C i ] divided into strongly connected components (identified by the dotted line encircling a set of nodes), with the blue and purple components being closed, and the green and orange components being open. Following the notation in Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), we have for the example in Fig. 2 , s = 4, s 1 = 3, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 2, s 4 = 1, and
If the topic set J j corresponds to a closed strongly connected component of G[C i ], then clearly in Eq. (11), C pj,i = 0 for all p = j. One can then use Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 to establish that for every k ∈ J j , there holds lim t→∞ y k (t) = α k 1 n exponentially fast, with α k ∈ [−1, 1]. That is, all opinions in topic k ∈ J j reach a consensus. If, on the other hand, the topic set J j corresponds to an open strongly connected component of G[C i ], then the results presented below can be employed sequentially in order to establish whether opinions on a given topic have reached a consensus. By "sequentially", we mean that we analyse
the topic sets J j with j in the order 1, 2, . . . , s. Under Assumption 2, define for each topic p ∈ J , the set
where c pq,i is the pq th entry of C i . In other words,Ĵ p identifies all topics q ∈ J that topic p is logically dependent upon. Because of Assumption 2, the setĴ p is the same for all individuals i ∈ I. In Fig. 2,Ĵ 6 for example is {4, 5}.
We present necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure every topic in the subset J j reaches a consensus of opinions in two theorems, the first for the case when the subset J j is a singleton (e.g. J 4 = {7} in Fig. 2) , and the second for when J j has at least two elements (e.g. J 3 = {5, 6} in Fig. 2 ). for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J , and (ii) that C i , ∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in Eq. (11) . Suppose that J j = {p}, as defined in Eq. (12), is a singleton, and letĴ p as defined in Eq. (13) be nonempty. Suppose further that all topics q ∈Ĵ p satisfy lim t→∞ y q = α q 1 n , α q ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, lim t→∞ y p (t) = α p 1 n for some α p ∈ R if and only if there exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] such that
If such a κ exists, then α p = κ.
The key necessary and sufficient condition involves Eq. (14) , which is somewhat complex and nonintuitive. We now provide a corollary which studies the condition in Eq. (14) for some situations which are important or of interest in the social context. Discussion and interpretation of these formal results are provided in the following Section III-C. (14) if either (i) the sign of c pq k ,i and α q k are equal for all i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . , r} or (ii) the sign of c pq k ,i and α q k are opposite for all i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . , r}. In the case of (i), κ = |α q k |, and in the case of (ii), κ = −|α q k |.
When J j is not a singleton, the analysis becomes significantly more involved. To that end, we first introduce some additional notation. Definẽ
as the set of topics not in J j that the topics in J j depend upon. For example, in Fig. 2 , J 3 = {5, 6},Ĵ 5 = {3, 6},Ĵ 6 = {4, 5}, andJ 3 = {3, 4}. Note that if J j = {p} is a singleton, we haveJ j =Ĵ p . Perhaps unsurprisingly, Theorem 4 requires that consensus must first occur for topics inJ j =Ĵ p , on which the topics in J j depend. The following theorem also has the requirement that consensus occur for all topics inJ j .
Theorem 5. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 2 hold. Assume that (i) y
for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J , and that (ii) C i , ∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in Eq. (11) . Suppose that J j , as defined in Eq. (12) , has at least two elements. LetJ j , as defined in Eq. (15), be nonempty and suppose further that all topics q ∈J j satisfy y * q = α q 1 n , α q ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, lim t→∞ y k = α k 1 n for all k ∈ J j if and only if, for every k ∈ J j , there exists a φ k ∈ [−1, 1] such that
If such a set of φ k exist, then α k = φ k for all k ∈ J j .
Similar to above, we now present a corollary which gives sufficient conditions for Eq. (16) in two scenarios. For the illustrative example in Fig. 2 , one would first analyse the blue and purple components using Theorem 3. Then, one would analyse the green component using Theorem 5, and last the orange component using Theorem 4.
C. Discussion and Social Interpretations
We conclude this section by providing some discussion and comments on the main results, focusing in particular on the theorems and corollaries in Section III-B. Overall, the outcomes we have established depend on the graphical structures G[C i ] on the one hand, and on the numerical values (including their signs) of the C i entries on the other. This dependence sometimes flows simply from the signs (the presence or absence of competing logical interdependencies), and sometimes from the precise values of the C i . Further, when consensus on a topic occurs, it is evident that sometimes a value 0 is always the outcome, and sometimes a nonzero value dependent on the initial opinions of those topics in the closed and strongly connected components of
It is clear from Theorem 3 that for any topic set J j corresponding to a closed and strongly connected component of G[C i ], every topic k ∈ J j will reach a consensus. One interpretation is that a closed and strongly connected component corresponds to J j having a topic(s) that is an axiom (or axioms) upon which an individual builds his or her belief system (see below Eq. (12)). Our results show that discussion of axiomatic topics will always lead a consensus under the model Eq. (1) (a consensus might not be reached if, as in Eq. (6), there is stubbornness present).
Theorem 3 and Corollaries 2 and 3 also illustrate that competing logical interdependencies, if present, can play a major role in determining the final opinion values. For instance, see Theorem 3 Part 3, where given a topic set J j corresponding to a closed and strongly connected component of G[C i ], all opinion values for all topics in J j converge to the neutral value at 0 whenever competing interdependencies are present in the topics in J j . Also, the presence of any competing logical interdependencies in topic p ∈ J j is enough to prevent the sufficient conditions detailed in Corollary 2 Item 1), 3), and 4) and Corollary 3 Item 2) from being satisfied. Of particular note is Corollary 2 Item 1). WhenĴ p = {q} is a singleton, heterogeneity in the entries of c pq,i is not enough to prevent a consensus of opinions on topic p; competing logical interdependences are required. This last finding is a surprising, and non-intuitive result.
The sufficient condition in Corollary 2 Item 2) requires α q = 0 for all q ∈Ĵ p . This is not as restrictive as it first seems: one possible scenario is that all elements ofĴ p belong to topics from the same closed and strongly connected component in G[C i ], with the component being structurally unbalanced, or having competing logical interdependencies. The same can be said for Corollary 3 Item 1). Part of the sufficient condition for Corollary 2 Item 4) is that |α qu | = |α qv | for all q u , q v ∈Ĵ p = {q 1 , . . . , q r }, r ≥ 2. This will always hold if q 1 , . . . , q r are topics that are part of the same closed and strongly connected component in
From numerous simulations, we frequently observed that minor heterogenieties in the entries of c pq,i , p ∈ J j among the individuals (e.g. if the c pq,i were all selected from a uniform distribution) were often sufficient to create disagreement among the opinions on topic p ∈ J j . We observed this in many different examples, except in the case of Corollary 2 Item 1), where J j = {p} andĴ p = {q} are both singletons, since existence of competing logical interdependencies was proven to be a necessary and sufficient condition for disagreement.
It is also clear from Theorems 3, 4 and 5 that disagreement is possible only in topic sets J j associated with an open strongly connected component of G[C i ]. Put another way, belief systems with a cascade logical structure, viz. reducible C i in the form of Eq. (11), including heterogeneity among individuals' belief systems, play a significant role in generating disagreement when social networks discuss multiple logically interdependent topics. Looking at Eq. (1), one can see two separate processes occurring: the DeGroot component describes interpersonal influence between individuals in an effort to reach a consensus, while the logic matrix by itself (as in Eq. (3)) captures an intrapersonal effort to secure logical consistency of opinions across several topics. These two drivers may or may not end up in conflict, and the presence of conflict or lack thereof determines whether opinions of a certain topic reach a consensus or fail to do so. Our results in Theorems 4 and 5 identify when such conflict can occur.
Remark 3. Theorems 4 and 5 establish necessary and sufficient conditions for topic p k ∈ J j = {p 1 , . . . , p sj } to reach a consensus under a particular hypothesis. Specifically, it is assumed that for the set J j under consideration, there holds
That is, all other topics that one or more topics p k ∈ J j depend upon are assumed to have reached a consensus. Based on numerous simulations, we believe the requirement that Eq. (17) holds is also a necessary condition for y p k , p k ∈ J j to reach a consensus. In other words, if any topic q ∈J j fails to reach a consensus, we conjecture that all y p k , k = 1, . . . , s j will also fail to reach a consensus. Confirming this would provide yet another indication that networks with belief systems having a cascade logic structure more readily result in disagreement. We leave this to future investigations.
IV. SIMULATIONS
We now provide simulations to illustrate some of the results in Section III using a network G[W ] of n = 6 individuals, with 
Note that W satisfies Assumption 3. Initial conditions are generated by selecting each x p i (0) from a uniform distribution in [−1, 1], and the same initial conditon vector x(0) is used for all simulations. We consider 5 topics, i.e. J = {1, . . . , 5}.
In the first simulation, we use two logic matrices: Fig. 4 . Notice that the only difference between C and C is a sign reversal in the c 21 entry. Now, there are competing logical interdependencies in Topic 2, which results in a failure to reach consensus on this topic (Corollary 2, Statement 1)). Because of the cascade logic structure, Topics 3, 4 and 5 also fail to reach a consensus (illustrating our conjecture in Remark 3). This is despite no other differences when comparing C and C, and Topics 4 and 5 reaching a consensus in the previous simulation when individuals 1, 2, 3 used C. Moreover, a strong diversity of opinions emerge for Topics 2, 3, 4 and 5.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied influence networks in which individuals discuss a set of logically interdependent topics, assuming that the network has no stubborn individuals in order to focus on the effects of the logical interdependence structure. We established that for strongly connected networks, and reasonable assumptions on the logic matrix, the opinions converge exponentially fast to some steady-state value. We then provided a systematic way to help determine whether a given topic will reach a consensus or fail to do so. It was discovered that heterogeneity of reducible logic matrices among individuals, including differences in signs of the off-diagonal entries, played a primary role in producing disagreement in the final opinion values. In the problem context, we have established that a cascade logic structure and heterogeneity of individuals' belief systems, including existence of competing logical interdependencies, generates the phenomenon of strong diversity of final opinions. We believe this to be a key new insight and explanation of strong diversity, since most existing works attribute strong diversity in connected networks to factors such as individual stubbornness. Future work will focus on proving the conjecture in Remark 3, relaxing Assumption 2, and the effect of the logic matrix on the convergence rate.
APPENDIX
To begin, we detail a result to be used in the sequel.
Lemma 2. Let A ∈ R n×n be a given irreducible rowsubstochastic matrix. Then, ρ(A) < 1.
Proof. This lemma is an immediate consequence of [31, Lemma 2.8].
In order to prove Theorem 2, we first establish the following lemma. Suppose that W ≥ 0 andC are primitive, and specifically that
0 (see below Lemma 1). Next, observe from Lemma 1 that G[C ⊗ W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic if and only ifC ⊗ W is primitive, i.e. ∃k ∈ N :
it is straightforward to conclude that one requires G[W ] and G[C], separately, to be strongly connected and aperiodic in order for G[A] to be strongly connected and aperiodic.
A. Theorem 2
The proof is has two parts: in Part 1 and Part 2, we prove convergence for irreducible and reducible C i , respectively.
Part 1: Consider the case where all the C i are irreducible (i.e. G[C i ] is strongly connected). We have that G[W ] and G[C i ], ∀i ∈ I are separately strongly connected and aperiodic from Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 (the aperiodicity is a consequence of the assumption that w ii > 0 and c pp,i > 0 for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J ). From Lemma 1, we then conclude that G[A] is strongly connected and aperiodic. Moreover, every diagonal entry of A is strictly positive. Using existing results on the Altafini model for strongly connected networks [11, Theorem 1 and 2], we conclude that lim t→∞ y(t) = y * exponentially fast, where y * ∈ R nm is the steady-state opinion distribution. Part 2: Consider now the case where all C i are reducible, with C i having the form in Eq. (11), S {1, 2, . . . s}, and
with block matrix elementsĀ pq , p, q ∈ S given
We prove the exponential convergence property by induction. First, for the base case consider the topics in J 1 , which are {1, 2, . . . , s 1 }. Since C 11,i is irreducible for all i ∈ I, we obtain from Part 1 that for all topics k ∈ J 1 , there holds lim t→∞ y k (t) = y * k exponentially fast, for some y * k ∈ R n . We now prove the induction step for topic k in the topic subset J p , with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2. Suppose that for all topics l ∈ ∪ p−1 j=1 J j , lim t→∞ y l (t) = y * l exponentially fast, where y * l is the vector of final opinions. We need to show that for all topics k in J p , there exists a vector y * k ∈ R n such that there holds lim t→∞ y k (t) = y * k exponentially fast. Look at the p-th block row of matrix A. Suppose first thatĀ pq = 0 for q < p. Since C pp,i is irreducible for any i ∈ I, then by the analysis in Part 1 of this proof, we conclude that for every k ∈ J p , there exists a y * k ∈ R n such that lim t→∞ y k (t) = y * k exponentially fast. Next, suppose to the contrary, that there exists a q < p such thatĀ pq = 0. Because G[C pp,i ], ∀i ∈ I are strongly connected and aperiodic, one can apply Lemma 3 to obtain that G[Ā pp ] is strongly connected and aperiodic, i.e. A pp is irreducible. Let |Ā pp | be the matrix whose ij th entry is the absolute value of the ij th entry ofĀ pp . SinceĀ pp is irreducible, then |Ā pp | is also irreducible. Because there exists q < p such thatĀ pq = 0, we conclude that |Ā pp | is rowsubstochastic. It follows from Lemma 2 that ρ(|Ā pp |) < 1. Using the triangle inequality, verify that the ij th entry of |Ā k pp | is less than or equal to the ij th entry of |Ā pp | k . Thus
It follows that
which in turn implies that ρ(Ā pp ) ≤ ρ(|Ā pp |) < 1. Recall that at the start of the induction step, we assumed that for all l ∈ ∪ p−1 j=1 J j (with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2), there exists y * l ∈ R n such that lim t→∞ y l (t) = y * l exponentially fast. Combining this assumption with the fact that ρ(Ā pp ) < 1, we conclude that for every k ∈ J p , there exists a y * k ∈ R n such that lim t→∞ y k (t) = y * k exponentially fast. The invariance property in which y p i (0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J implies y p i (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I and p ∈ J was proved in [20] , using the fact that n q=1 |c pq,i | = 1 as detailed in Assumption 1.
B. Analysis for Subsection III-B
Here, we present a supporting result that links the structural balance of the graph G[A] to the structural balance of G[C i ], i ∈ I, which will be used to help prove the main result on consensus for irreducible C i .
First, we introduce additional graph-theoretic concepts. For a given (possibly signed) graph G, an undirected cycle is a cycle of G that ignores the direction of the edges, and an undirected cycle is negative if it contains an odd number of edges with negative edge weight. A signed graph G is structurally unbalanced if and only if it has at least one negative undirected cycle [29] .
We now establish several additional properties of how the entries c ij,k of C k relate to edges in G[A]. has an incoming edge from a node V q , and every node in V q has an outgoing edge to a node in V p .
Proof. First, recall that A pq diag(c pq )W as below Eq. (9). Item 1): From Assumption 1, we know that c pp,i > 0 ∀ i ∈ I and p ∈ J . This implies that A pp ∼ W and A pp ≥ 0 with all positive diagonals, which implies that G[A pp ] is strongly connected and aperiodic.
Item 2): Notice that A pq is nonzero if and only if c pq,i = 0, i ∈ I. Moreover, the ij th entry of a nonzero A pq is nonzero if and only if w ij > 0, and has the same sign as c pq,i . Recall that we defined node subsets V p = {v (p−1)n+1 , . . . , v pn }, p ∈ J for the graph G[A]. It follows that an edge from node v (q−1)n+j ∈ V q to v (p−1)n+i ∈ V p exists if and only if w ij > 0 and c pq,i = 0, and has the same sign as c pq,i .
Item 3):
This statement is obtained by (i) recalling the definition of the node set V p = {v (p−1)n+1 , . . . , v pn }, p ∈ J , (ii) observing that an irreducible W implies that for any i ∈ I, there exists a j ∈ I, i = j such that w ij > 0, and (iii) by applying Item 2).
We now turn to study of the structural balance of G[A] and its relation to the structural balance of the G[C i ]s. With these properties in mind, consider a structurally unbalanced G[C]; since G[C] is strongly connected, the unbalance property implies there is at least one negative directed cycle. Without loss of generality, consider the negative cycle
with z 1 , . . . z r ∈ J and r ≥ 1. Let u ∈ N be the odd number of negative edges in the undirected cycle. From Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 4, and using the fact that w ii > 0 ∀ i ∈ I, we find that there is an undirected cycle in G[A] given as
The undirected cycle π contains precisely u edges with negative weight, which implies that π is a negative cycle. It follows that G[A] is structurally unbalanced. Next, consider a structurally balanced G[C], and assume without loss of generality that the nodes are ordered such that they can be partitioned into disjoint sets V + = {v If v c,z1 , . . . , v c,zr ∈ V + , then we conclude from Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 4 that all edges in π have positive weight. In both cases, π is not a negative undirected cycle. Now suppose that z 1 , . . . z k , with k < r, are such that v c,z1 , . . . v c,z k ∈ V − . Notice that for any two nodesṽ and v in the subgraphs G[A pp ], p ∈ {1, . . . , s}, a path fromṽ tô v which traverses nodes in the subgraphs G[A], q ∈ {s + 1, . . . , m} has an even number of edges with negative weight. This is because v c,p ∈ V + , p ∈ {1, . . . , s} and v c,q ∈ V − , q ∈ {s+1, . . . , m}. From the fact thatv ∈ G[A 11 ], one can use this previous property to show that there exist nonnegative integers u 1 , . . . , u k such that the number of edges in π with negative weight is precisely 
with z 1 , . . . z r ∈ I and r ≥ 1. The single negative edge in this undirected cycle is (v (p−1)n+k , v (q−1)n+k ), which means the undirected cycle is negative. It follows that G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove Statement 1). If there are no competing logical interdependencies and G[C i ], ∀ i ∈ I are structurally balanced, then G[A] is structurally balanced according to Lemma 5. According to [11, Theorem 1] , for almost all initial conditions the system Eq. (10) converges to a nonzero modulus consensus, i.e. lim t→∞ |y i p (t)| = |y j q (t)| = 0 for all i, j ∈ I and p, q ∈ J . It remains to prove that lim t→∞ y k (t) = α k 1 n , ∀k ∈ J .
For a structurally balanced G[A], the nodes v i ∈ V can be partitioned into two disjoint sets V + and V − , where every edge between nodes in the same set has positive weight, and every edge between nodes of V + and V − has negative weight. Item 1) of Lemma 4 implies that for any k ∈ J , the nodes v (k−1)n+1 , . . . , v kn all belong in either V + or V − . Recalling that the node v (k−1)n+i corresponds to the variable y 
E. Proof of Theorem 4
First, observe that if J j = {p} is a singleton, then the block diagonal matrixĀ pp in Eq. (21) is in factĀ pp = A pp = diag(c pp )W , where diag(c p q), p, q ∈ J is defined below Eq. (9). Since 0 < c pp,i < 1 for all i ∈ I, and W is row-stochastic, we have that A pp ∞ < 1 ⇒ ρ(A pp ) < 1. This implies that (I n − A pp ) −1 exists. LettingĴ p be the set of topics that topic p logically depends upon, as defined in Eq. (13), the vector y p (t) converges exponentially fast to
We now focus on proving that y * p reaches a consensus state if and only if Eq. (14) holds for some α p ∈ [−1, 1]. Let R pp = I n − A pp , and because W is row-stochastic, one obtains that A pq 1 n = diag(c pq )1 n for any q, p ∈ J and R pp 1 n = (I n − diag(c pp ))1 n . We use this observation several times below.
Sufficiency: Because J j = {p}, we can obtain from Eq. (11) that c pq,i = 0 for every q > p. Combining this with Assumption 1 yields 1 − c pp,i = q∈Ĵp |c pq,i |. This implies that if there exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I, then q∈Ĵp α q diag(c pq ) = κ(I n − diag(c pp )). Recalling that by the theorem hypothesis y * q = α q 1 n for every q ∈Ĵ p , Eq. (24) then yields
This also shows that α p = κ.
Necessity: Suppose in order to obtain a contradiction, that y * p = α p 1 n for some α p and there does not exist a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I. Substituting y * p = α p 1 n into the left hand side of Eq. (24), we obtain
Multiplying both sides by R pp yields
However, Eq. (25) implies that for all i ∈ I, there holds
Clearly, this contradicts the assumption made at the start of the proof of necessity: there does not exist a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I. This completes the proof.
F. Proof of Corollary 2
We prove each statement of Corollary 2 separately. First, note that |α q | ≤ 1, which implies that the quantity on the right hand side of Eq. (14) For the proof of necessity, suppose that there are competing logical interdependencies in topic p, and suppose c pq,1 > 0 and c pq,2 < 0 (see below Eq. (7) on why we can make this assumption without loss of generality). Then, sgn(α q c pq,1 ) = − sgn(α q c pq,2 ), which implies that there does not exist a κ such that Eq. (14) simultaneously holds for i = 1 and i = 2.
Statement 2): The proof is trivial, since the right hand side of Eq. (14) is zero for all i ∈ I. Statement 3): The condition c pq k ,i = c pq k ,j = c pq k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i, j ∈ I implies that 
where z k = [c pq k ,1 , . . . , c pq k ,n ] , and Ξ k is a diagonal matrix with i th diagonal entry being sgn(c pq k ,i ). Because we assumed that |α qu | = |α qv | for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}, letᾱ |α q k |.
In the case of (i), where sgn(c pq k ,i ) = sgn(α q k ) for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, it follows that α q k z k =ᾱΞ k z k . Rearranging Eq. (28) yields
Sinceᾱ ∈ [−1, 1], choosing κ =ᾱ ensures that Eq. (28) holds. The proof for case (ii) is the same, except that α q k z k = −ᾱΞ k z k and one selects κ = −ᾱ to satisfy Eq. (28).
G. Proof of Theorem 5
First, note that for any p, q ∈ J , A pq 1 n = diag(c pq )1 n , where diag(c pq ) has been defined below Eq. (9). For notational convenience, let J j = {k 1 , . . . , k sj } with s j ≥ 2. In other words, we replace for brevity j i=1 s i−1 + p in Eq. (12) with k p , for p = 1, . . . , s j . We proved in Theorem 2 that ρ(Ā jj ) < 1 for every j ∈ S which, combined with the assumption that y * q = α q 1 n , α q ∈ [−1, 1] for all q ∈J j , yields
. . . 
where y * k = lim t→∞ y k (t) for k ∈ J j . Sufficiency: Observe that, for any k ∈ J j , there holds 
One can verify that Eq. (32) holding for every k ∈ J j and i ∈ I is equivalent to the following equality: 
Next, observe that
with the first equality obtained by recalling that W 1 n = 1 n , and the last equality obtained by verifying from Eq. (22) 
with the first equality obtained by substituting in the left hand side of Eq. (33), and the last equality obtained from Eq. (35). It follows that y * k = φ k 1 n for every k ∈ J j . Necessity: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that for every p ∈ {1, . . . , s j }, (i) there do not exist φ k1 , . . . , φ ks j ∈ [−1, 1] such that Eq. (16) 
holding for all k ∈ J j and i ∈ I. Using the equality in Eq. ( 
However, Eq. (40) contradicts the assumption made at the start of this (necessity) part of the proof: there do no exist φ k1 , . . . , φ ks j ∈ [−1, 1] such that Eq. (16) holds for every k p ∈ J j and i ∈ I. This completes the proof.
H. Proof of Corollary 3
We prove each item separately. Item 1: This result can be immediately obtained by checking Eq. (16) with α q = 0 for all q ∈J j .
Item 2: First, note that C i is of the form in Eq. (11) , which implies that c ka,i = 0 for all k ∈ J j , a > max J j , and i ∈ I. LetĀ jj be defined as in Eq. (22) . Similar to the proof of Theorem 5, let J j = {k 1 , . . . , k sj } with s j ≥ 2. Supposing that there holds c kp,g = c kp,h = c kp for k ∈ J j and p ∈ J , defineC 
Then, I −Ā jj = I nsj −C ⊗W . Since ρ(Ā jj ) < 1, we obtain from the Neumann series that (I −Ā jj ) −1 = ∞ t=0Ā jj t = ∞ t=0C t ⊗ W t . Let |C| be the matrix whose ij th entry is the absolute value of the ij th entry ofC. Assumption 1 and the fact thatJ j = ∅ implies that |C| is row-substochastic. Using calculations similar to those at the end of Appendix A, one can show that ρ(C) < 1, which establishes the existence of 
since W t is a row-stochastic matrix for any t ∈ N. We have thus concluded that the right hand side of Eq. (43) is equal to u ⊗ 1 n for u = ∞ t=0C tα ∈ R sj . This implies that for every k ∈ J j , we have y * k = α k 1 n for some α k ∈ [−1, 1].
